Gerald A. McIntyre CA Bar No. 181746 1 gmcintyre@justiceinaging.org JUSTICE IN AGING 2 3660 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 718 Los Angeles, CA 90010 3 Phone: (213) 639-0930 Fax: (213) 550-0501 4 Attorney for Plaintiffs 5 Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 Case No. 2:15-cv-1732 PA (JCx) 12 **HUGH HELD** and **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS** KELLEY RICHARDSON-WRIGHT, 13 AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' on behalf of themselves MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY and all other similarly situated, 14 INJUNCTION [Notice of Motion and Motion for Plaintiffs, 15 Preliminary Injunction; Supporting Declarations; and [Proposed] Order filed concurrently 16 v. Monday, July 20, 2015 Date: CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 17 Time: 1:30 p.m. Acting Commissioner of Social Courtroom: 15 Security, in her official capacity, 18 Defendant. 19 24

1		TABLE OF CONTENTS		
2				
3	TAB	LE OF	F AUTHORITIES	ii
4	I.	INTE	RODUCTION	1
5	II.	BACKGROUND		2
		A.	Supplemental Security Income	2
6		B.	SSA Violated Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights	3
7		C.	SSA Continues Discriminating Against Plaintiffs after Windsor	4
8		D.	After the Filing of this Action, SSA Temporarily Halts Initiation of New Attempts to Recoup Overpayments	7
9	III.	II. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION8		8
10		A.	Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits	.10
11			1. The Overpayments Were a Consequence of SSA's Continued Unlawful Discrimination after <i>Windsor</i>	. 10
1213			2. SSA's Recoupment of Overpayments Violates the Social Security Act	. 14
14			3. SSA Violated Plaintiffs' Procedural Due Process Rights	.18
15		B.	Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm	.20
16		C.	The Harm to Plaintiffs Outweighs the Harm to SSA	.22
		D.	The Public Interest Favors an Injunction	.23
17	IV.	CON	ICLUSION	.24
18				
19				
24				
			- i -	

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES				
2	CASES				
3	Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Corttrell,				
4	632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011)10				
5	Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937)18				
67	Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1982)23				
8	Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)13				
9	Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)14				
11	Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)				
12	Elliott v. Weinberger, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12532 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975)				
14	Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)20				
15	Green v. Cnty. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)13				
l6 l7	Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)18				
18	Latta v. Otter, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19620 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014)12				
24	Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 2014)24				
	- ii -				

1	Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1983)			
2	Lewin v. Schweiker,			
3	654 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1981)			
4	Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983)22, 23, 24			
5				
6	<i>Melendres v. Arpaio</i> , 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012)20			
7	Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990)16, 17, 18			
8				
9	Rini v. Harris, 615 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1980)			
10	SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014)12			
11	7 10 1 .30 171 (701 CH. 2011)			
12	United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)			
13	STATUTORY AUTHORITIES			
14	1 U.S.C. § 7			
15	42 U.S.C. § 1381a2			
16	42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)			
17	42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)(A)			
18				
19				
24				
	- iii -			

1	RULES AND REGULATIONS
2	20 C.F.R. § 416.110
3	20 C.F.R. § 416.12052
4	ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Acquiescence Ruling 92-5(9)
- - T	
	- iv -

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a proposed class action about the effects of continued discrimination by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), against Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") recipients married to a person of the same sex, long after that discrimination was held unlawful by the Supreme Court in *United States v*.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). After Windsor, SSA should have recognized these marriages immediately. Yet it failed to do so. Hugh Held and Kelley Richardson-Wright bring this action on behalf of a class of similarly-situated individuals (collectively, "Plaintiffs") married to someone of the same sex and who have been or will be targeted by SSA for recoupment of overpayments caused by SSA's failure to recognize their marriages.

Class members should not be liable for overpayments caused by SSA's unlawful conduct. SSA's unreasonable and unjustified delay in recognizing Plaintiffs' marriages after *Windsor* was a violation of the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and the overpayments were a consequence of that discrimination. In addition, under the Social Security Act, SSA may not recoup overpayments if the recipient was without fault and if recoupment would be against equity and good conscience. SSA can meet neither of these requirements here. Lastly, SSA has violated Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to consider the evidence already in its possession showing that SSA, not Plaintiffs,

is at fault and that recoupment is against equity and good conscience.

Permitting SSA, during the pendency of this case, to seek recovery of overpayments caused by its unlawful conduct will cause irreparable harm. To avoid that harm, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction (1) enjoining SSA from making any effort to recoup overpayments caused by SSA's failure to recognize Plaintiffs' marriages after the *Windsor* decision; and (2) requiring SSA to return any such funds already withheld or otherwise received.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Supplemental Security Income

SSI is a federal assistance program designed to provide individuals in the greatest need income for basic necessities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.110. SSA administers the SSI program. *Id.*; 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. In order to be eligible, an individual must be age 65 or older, blind, or disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). In addition, SSI recipients must be very poor—individuals must have less than \$2,000 in resources, and married couples must collectively have less than \$3,000 in resources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205. The maximum federal benefit is \$733 per month for an individual and \$1,100 a month for a married couple. Bychowski Decl., Ex. A

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¹ Some states provide a modest supplement to the federal benefit.

(POMS SI 02001.020).² Marriage always results in a lower amount of individual monthly SSI benefits and may result in a complete loss of benefits.

B. SSA Violated Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights

Plaintiffs' claims have their roots in the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which declared that marriages of same-sex couples would not have status equal to marriages of different-sex couples. Section 3 of DOMA (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7) stated that, for the purpose of determining the meaning of any federal law, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."

Starting in 2004, a growing number of states began to allow same-sex couples to marry. These included Massachusetts, where Plaintiff Kelley Richardson-Wright and her wife Kena Richardson-Wright were married in 2007, and California, home to Plaintiff Hugh Held and his husband Orion Masters, a couple since 1993 who married in 2008. Nevertheless, because of DOMA, SSA did not recognize the marriages of same-sex couples for purposes of SSI. Instead, SSA treated applicants married to a person of the same sex as single.

² The declaration of Stephen T. Bychowski is filed concurrently with this memorandum. The declarations of (1) Hugh Held and (2) Kelley and Kena Richardson-Wright cited in this memorandum were filed with Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, ECF Doc. Nos. 26-2, 26-3.

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The actions of SSA and other federal agencies in denying equal status to Plaintiffs, and others, were declared illegal by the Supreme Court's June 2013 2 decision in *United States v. Windsor*, striking down Section 3 of DOMA because it 3 violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 4 The Court explained the government had used DOMA to "impose a disadvantage," 5 a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages." *Id*. 6 7 at 2693. The Court elaborated that "DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own 8 9 children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others." *Id.* at 2696. Because "the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to 10 demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage," the Court held that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2694. 12 C. SSA Continues Discriminating Against Plaintiffs after Windsor 13 Nevertheless, SSA continued for over a year after Windsor to treat SSI 14 recipients who were married to a person of the same sex as if they were single.³ 15 16 ³ After Windsor, individuals married to someone of the same sex who filed new SSI 17 applications had their applications placed on hold by SSA. In January 2014, six months after Windsor, SSA finally began to process those applications and ceased its 18 discrimination against new SSI applicants. See Bychowski Decl., Ex. B (Social Security Publishes New Supplemental Security Income Rules Involving Same-Sex Married 19 Couples, Social Security Admin. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ssa.gov/news/#!/post/1-2014-7). But SSA still continued to treat Plaintiffs, who were already receiving SSI, as if 24 they were single.

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During this time, SSA provided little guidance to the employees in its field offices, much less to SSI recipients, as to when or how it would adjust its practices to recognize marriages of same-sex couples and cease its unlawful discrimination. For example, Kelley Richardson-Wright had a routine financial redetermination in October 2014, over a year after *Windsor*. Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 9. Even though SSA knew of her marital status, it said nothing at the time about any changes to her SSI benefits. Id. Similarly, shortly after Windsor, Hugh Held went to an SSA office and inquired as to the impact on his benefits. Held Decl. at ¶ 6. The SSA representative told him that it might affect his benefits, but it was unclear how. Id. It was not until the summer of 2014, a year after Windsor, that SSA began sending notices to some SSI recipients about how SSA would be calculating their benefits as married individuals, for the first time recognizing these marriages. See, e.g., Held Decl. at ¶ 10, Ex. D; Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. B. SSA also began seeking to recoup overpayments caused by its delay by recalculating Plaintiffs' past benefits as if SSA had complied with Windsor from the start. Held Decl. at ¶ 10, Ex. D; Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 14, Ex. E. In effect, SSA's benefits calculation assumes a counterfactual and imaginary world where SSA had immediately complied with *Windsor*. The couples subjected to the discrimination have been left to bear the consequences of SSA's unlawful conduct.

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For example, in June 2014, a year after *Windsor*, Mr. Held received, without explanation or warning, an SSI benefit almost two-thirds lower than his prior benefit (\$308 versus \$877) and then a statement telling him he had to pay back an overpayment of over \$6,000. Held Decl. at ¶ 7. It took until September for SSA to explain that SSA had overpaid him because SSA had not recognized his marriage. *Id.* at ¶ 10. SSA was similarly aware of Plaintiff Kelley Richardson-Wright's marriage. Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 6. In late November 2014, nearly *a year and a half* after Windsor, SSA kicked off a confusing two-week-long flurry of a half dozen inconsistent and conflicting notices. *Id.* at ¶ 10. These culminated in a December 2014 notice of overpayment stating that Ms. Richardson-Wright had been overpaid by approximately \$4,100 because her "[s]pouse's wages are now taken into account" – i.e. because SSA finally was recognizing her marriage. Id. at ¶ 16, Ex. F. Bizarrely, SSA's notice also asked Ms. Richardson-Wright to explain why "[i]t wasn't KELLEY S RICHARDSON-WRIGHT's fault that she got too much SSI money," even though SSA is surely aware that the reason for the overpayment was SSA's failure to comply with *Windsor*. *Id.*, Ex. F at 2. Even though Ms. Richardson-Wright sought reconsideration from SSA, SSA began to withhold funds from her benefits, and only after the Complaint in this action was filed ceased doing so, and reimbursed the improperly withheld funds. *Id.* at ¶ 31.

These events caused Ms. Richardson-Wright and her wife, Kena, to forgo basic necessities and put them at risk of eviction from their home. *Id.* at ¶ 22. The SSI reduction occurred at a particularly difficult financial time for the couple. *Id.* at ¶ 28. The stress from the extreme financial strain caused by the reduction in SSI payments caused Kelley to be hospitalized. *Id.* at ¶ 23. While Kelley was in the hospital, Kena's car was repossessed. *Id.* at ¶ 24.

D. After the Filing of this Action, SSA Temporarily Halts Initiation of New Attempts to Recoup Overpayments

In a tacit admission that its conduct in seeking recoupment of these overpayments is unlawful, unfair, and causes irreparable harm, after the Complaint in this action was filed, SSA issued an emergency directive to its field adjudicators instructing them to put a halt to that practice, but only for a few months.

Specifically, on May 6, 2015, SSA issued an "Emergency Message" that adjudicators should put "on hold, effective immediately, any ... SSI... posteligibility action that would result in an overpayment for past months due to [recognition of a same-sex marriage]." Bychowski Decl., Ex. C (SSA EM-15016).⁴ The emergency communication emphasized that "[r]egardless of when

²⁴ SSA's Emergency Message is also available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/reference.nsf/links/05052015024754PM.

the change occurred or when SSA first learned of the event, do not create an overpayment on a recipient's SSI record due to recognition of a same-sex marriage." *Id.* This directive, by its terms, expires on October 30, 2015, although the expiration date can be extended or shortened at any time. It also excludes SSI recipients already in overpayment status as of May 6, 2015. *Id.* It does not purport to be a change in policy; it is simply a temporary hold on new collections. The directive does not instruct SSA staff to cease recovery efforts of previously determined overpayments or to refund previously withheld overpayments, nor does it address whether collection of such overpayments would be against equity and good conscience. *Id.*

As for the named plaintiffs, after the filing of the Complaint in this action, SSA notified each of them that it was granting them waivers of overpayments, even though SSA collected no further evidence from them and held no further proceedings. Held Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. F; Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 33, Ex. K.

III. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent SSA from placing the burden of its continued post-*Windsor* discrimination on the class.

Specifically, SSA should be enjoined from withholding funds from Plaintiffs' benefits in an effort to recoup any overpayments caused by SSA's failure to timely

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recognize Plaintiffs' marriages and should be required to return any such funds already withheld. SSA should also be enjoined from issuing notices of overpayment or taking any other steps to recover such overpayments. Simply put, allowing SSA to further add to Plaintiffs' injury will only exacerbate the already irreparable harm caused by SSA's failure to promptly cease its discrimination following *Windsor*.

SSA's recent temporary and partial emergency efforts – apparently spurred by this lawsuit – to avoid some of the widespread and continuing harm from its unlawful discrimination and subsequent collection practices are welcome, but inadequate. Although SSA appears to recognize that its actions have been sufficiently harmful to require emergency action to temporarily halt them, SSA continues to hold the threat of a potential future overpayment notice over the heads of the entire class. But, come October 2015 (or earlier, if SSA chooses to revoke its directive), adjudicators are free to resume collection activities. In the meantime, class members have been thrust even further into a months-long limbo, with no power to prepare to pay if SSA decides to collect or to stop overpayments if they are continuing. Indeed, SSA's emergency action does not halt SSA's discriminatory conduct at all; it only delays the date of reckoning and, if anything, permits the harm and uncertainty to the class to mount. As for unnamed class members who *already* had received notices of overpayments prior to SSA's

emergency action, they have received no relief at all.

Plaintiffs, by this motion, in effect simply ask that SSA's existing hold extend to *all* class members, even those already in overpayment status and for SSA to be required to maintain its hold during the pendency of this case, rather than for an arbitrary period of a few months. When the traditional factors for issuance of a preliminary injunction are considered here – (1) whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm; (3) whether the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the harm to the defendant; and (4) whether an injunction is in the public interest – the factors individually and on balance strongly weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction. *See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).

A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits

The Overpayments Were a Consequence of SSA's Continued
 Unlawful Discrimination after Windsor

The Supreme Court in *Windsor* has *already* held that treating lawfully married couples, such as Plaintiffs, as single because they are married to a person of the same sex violates the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. Yet, despite *Windsor*, SSA treated SSI recipients married to persons of the same sex as unmarried for over a year after *Windsor* was decided. Thus, for over a year, SSA failed to recognize Plaintiffs' marriages and knowingly miscalculated their

SSI benefits.

SSA's continued treatment of Plaintiffs as single following *Windsor* could not be a plainer violation of *Windsor* and the Constitution. The overpayments are a consequence of that violation. Obviously, Plaintiffs would not be facing substantial overpayment liabilities – indeed, the overpayments would not have even occurred – if SSA had only followed *Windsor* and the Constitution. SSA's attempt to end its discrimination by retroactively recognizing marriages and then seeking to collect overpayments does not cure the Constitutional harm: it compounds it.

This harm includes not only the stigma recognized by the Supreme Court from SSA's failure to recognize Plaintiffs' marriages during that time, but also the uncertainty the conduct caused, the deprivation of SSI recipients' ability to plan financially for sudden overpayment liabilities, and the additional stigma of now being blamed for an overpayment Plaintiffs did not cause and had no ability to avoid. Moreover, had SSA paid the correct amount in the first place, many would have been eligible for increased amounts of other need-based assistance, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits (also known as food stamps), home energy assistance, or subsidized housing benefits. For example, Kelley Richardson-Wright and her wife would have received a greater amount of SNAP benefits and probably would have qualified for an increased amount of

energy assistance if they had been paid correctly. Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶ 29. None of these harms are corrected by SSI's belated and retroactive marriage recognition and all are exacerbated by its overpayment collection activities.

By contrast, during the months following *Windsor*, SSA, of course, recognized the marriages of couples of different sex and calculated their benefits using their proper marital status. Those couples have not been put at risk of a substantial overpayment liability, and the resultant financial uncertainty, caused by a retroactive change in how SSA recognized their marriages.

This disparate treatment based on sexual orientation is subject to, at least, heightened scrutiny. *SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs*, 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, SSA's unequal treatment is impermissible unless it serves an important governmental objective and is substantially related to the achievement of that objective. *Latta v. Otter*, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19620, at *60 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014). SSA's "burden of justification" is "demanding" and must be "exceedingly persuasive." *Id*.

SSA cannot meet this stringent standard. SSA began processing some Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance ("OASDI") claims for spousal retirement benefits based on marriages between individuals of the same sex in August, 2013, a month and a half after *Windsor*. SSA began processing new SSI applications in January 2014, seven months after *Windsor*. There was no reason to believe that

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the legal standard for recognizing the marriages of existing SSI recipients could be different from the standard applied to new SSI applicants. SSA also had years to prepare for the possibility of the end of DOMA. Here, all that SSA had to do was recognize the marriages of same-sex couples in the same way as SSA has been recognizing the marriages of different-sex couples for over half a century. There is no "important governmental objective" that could justify SSA's failure for over a year to correct a Constitutional violation found by the Supreme Court.

Indeed, where the government has violated the Equal Protection guarantee of the Constitution, it normally must immediately correct the discrimination and remove all vestiges of it. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (obedience to the Constitution generally required "immediate" desegregation because "delay in any guise in order to deny... constitutional rights [can] not be countenanced"); cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("The burden rests upon the [government] to establish that [additional] time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date."). As the Supreme Court explained in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968), when the government has unconstitutionally discriminated, it is "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which ... discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Indeed, "[e]ach instance of a failure ... to fulfill this affirmative duty

continues the [Equal Protection] violation." *Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick*, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979).

SSA's attempt to recoup overpayments caused by its conduct does not eliminate the discrimination "root and branch," but extends its tendrils and magnifies its effects. All SSA needed to do here was treat married couples of the same sex the same way SSA was *already* treating other married couples when it came to calculating their SSI benefits and eligibility. SSA's failure to do so for over a year was wrong, it was unconstitutional, and it was inexcusable.

2. SSA's Recoupment of Overpayments Violates the Social Security Act

The Social Security Act requires SSA to refrain from "penalizing" a recipient who has been paid "more ... than the correct amount" where (1) the overpayment was not the fault of the recipient and (2) recoupment would be against equity and good conscience. Specifically, it states that:

The Commissioner of Social Security ... shall make such provision as the Commissioner finds appropriate in the case of payment of more than the correct amount of benefits with respect to an individual with a view to avoiding penalizing such individual or his eligible spouse who was without fault in connection with the overpayment, if adjustment or recovery on account of such overpayment in such case

would defeat the purposes of this subchapter or be against equity and 1 2 good conscience. 3 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(1)(A) (emphases added). In these circumstances, any attempt by SSA to recoup overpayments caused by SSA's continued post-Windsor 4 discrimination necessarily violates this statutory mandate. 5 This is not a case that involves close questions of fault, fairness, and equity, 6 7 where individualized differences may tilt the balance. These overpayments were the result of an unlawful, discriminatory policy on the part of SSA that Plaintiffs 8 9 were powerless to affect. The fault here is exclusively SSA's, not Plaintiffs', and the inequity and unfairness of SSA's demand to recoup overpayments caused by 10 11 its own discriminatory conduct is self-evident. As a group, Plaintiffs are not at fault for SSA's overpayments. The 12 13 overpayments were the result of SSA's failure to recognize the marriages of samesex couples as required by Windsor. SSA was aware it was calculating Plaintiffs' 14 benefits incorrectly and in violation of the Constitution, and it failed to do anything 15 about it for over a year. "The fault in this case belongs at the agency's doorstep." 16 Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Rini v. Harris, 615 17 18 F.2d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 1980)) (holding that recoupment was improper). Class members are not at fault regardless of whether they knew of SSA's 19 24 failure to implement *Windsor* and recognize their marriages. Those that did not

know were plainly not at fault. See Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1990) ("It is undisputed that Quinlivan was without fault" because "[h]e was unaware of the change in the law."). If any did know, SSA's conduct put them in an impossible state of fiscal limbo. There was nothing they could have done to cause SSA to recognize their marriage and calculate their benefits correctly. For example, after Windsor, Plaintiff Hugh Held inquired with SSA about the impact of the decision on his benefits, but SSA told him that Windsor's impact was unclear. Held Decl. at ¶ 6. Mr. Held and the other class members were left in the uncertain hands of SSA, unsure when SSA would get around to implementing *Windsor* and whether and how SSA would recalculate their previous payments when it did. See Lewin, 654 F.2d at 636 (plaintiff not at fault in part because "the benefit program itself was in a state of flux at [the] time"). Moreover, even overpayments are easily consumed by necessary living expenses. The maximum federal and state SSI monthly benefit in California is \$889.40 for an individual and \$1,496.20 for a married couple if both spouses are SSI eligible. Bychowski Decl., Ex. A (POMS SI 02001.020). This is well below, for example, the approximately \$1,950 per month estimated for basic living

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expenses for even an unmarried senior citizen in California.⁵ Moreover, given the

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⁵ See Bychowski Decl., Ex. D (California Elder Economic Security Index, available at http://www.insightcced.org/communities/cfess/eesiDetail.html?ref=60).

aside overpayments based on the hypothetical possibility that SSA might someday retroactively recognize their marriages. If Plaintiffs had saved the overpayments, they quickly would have accumulated sufficient resources to become ineligible for SSI or other needs based benefits.

Recouping the overpayments is also against equity and good conscience.

While SSA guidance improperly limits the meaning of "equity and good conscience" to just three enumerated circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has rejected that constrained view of equity and instead requires SSA to apply a "broad concept of fairness." *Ouinlivan*, 916 F.2d at 527.6

The unfairness of requiring discriminated-against couples to bear the burden, uncertainty, and consequences of an agency's discriminatory conduct needs no further elaboration. Fairness and equity demand that the consequences of unlawful discrimination be borne by the perpetrator of discrimination, not its targets. Moreover, SSA's action placed Plaintiffs in an impossible Catch-22. As

⁶ Because of *Quinlivan*, SSA revised its definition of "equity and good conscience" to properly apply the statute's mandate that SSA do equity by its actions—but only for claimants who reside in Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, or Washington. Bychowski Decl., Ex. E (Acquiescence Ruling 92-5(9)).

noted above, due to SSI's resource limits Plaintiffs could not retain the amount of the overpayment even if they could speculatively predict when SSA might finally recognize their marriage for purpose of ongoing benefits or how it would do so. As the Ninth Circuit explained in *Quinlivan*, "[i]t is unfair to have expected [plaintiff] to hold the funds for more than two years ... with eligibility for general assistance dependent on his level of assets." *Id.* On the other hand, if Plaintiffs continued to use their SSI benefits to pay for their essential needs – just as they had been doing before *Windsor* – they would risk being later hit with an overpayment bill potentially in the thousands of dollars.

3. SSA Violated Plaintiffs' Procedural Due Process Rights

A fundamental component of due process is the requirement that the government *at least consider the relevant evidence already in its possession* before seeking to deprive people of their life, liberty, or property. As far back as 1937, the Supreme Court held that a government body "must consider the evidence and base its findings and decision upon it." *Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis*, 301 U.S. 337, 357 (1937). More recently, the Ninth Circuit held that this requirement is so basic that reviewing courts presume it occurs. *Larita-Martinez v. INS*, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is so expected that a court would review all relevant materials in the record that reviewing courts have presumed it.")

SSA's recoupment of overpayments is a deprivation of property entitling

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Plaintiffs to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. See Elliott v. Weinberger, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 12532, at *32 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975). There can be no doubt SSA ignored the evidence in its possession that these overpayments were SSA's fault, not Plaintiffs', and that recoupment is unfair. The overpayments are the consequence of SSA's delay in implementing Windsor, not anything that Plaintiffs have done, as SSA surely knows. Yet, SSA's notices of overpayment have demanded proof that Plaintiffs, such as Kelley Richardson-Wright, explain to SSA why "[i]t wasn't KELLEY S RICHARDSON-WRIGHT's fault that she got too much SSI money." Richardson-Wright Decl., Ex. F at 2. Given the circumstances, that demand is nonsensical, and shows that SSA failed to even consider the relevant facts. Due process required more before SSA launched its attempts to seek recoupment. Indeed, after this action was filed, SSA granted Plaintiffs Hugh Held and Kelley Richardson-Wright waivers without requesting *any* further information from them or conducting *any* further proceedings. The only new information SSA learned about their cases was that these two individuals had filed a class action lawsuit. SSA knew then, and it plainly knows now, that it cannot collect overpayments in these circumstances without violating both the Constitution and the Social Security Act. It should be enjoined from taking actions that would knowingly violate the law.

B. Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm

Because SSA's actions involve "the deprivation of constitutional rights" this "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Melendres* v. *Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Elrod* v. *Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). SSA's emergency directive, following the institution of this lawsuit, to put on hold any action that would put additional individuals into overpayment status shows that SSA recognizes the serious and irreparable harm its attempts to collect overpayments have and will cause. SSA's action is laudable, but it is still partial and temporary, and does not avoid all irreparable harm. It is expressly only a temporary solution, is entirely voluntary, can be modified or revoked by SSA at any time, gives class members within its scope little to no assurances or ability to plan their finances in the event the hold is lifted, and provides no relief to those already in overpayment status before the directive was put in place.

SSA irreparably harmed all class members by failing to recognize their marriages for over a year in violation of the Supreme Court's clear mandate that such conduct was unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court stated in *Windsor*, SSA's unequal treatment "demean[s] those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage" and indicates to them that "their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others." 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694-96 (2013).

Recoupment efforts, indeed even the threat of them, impose a real and

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irreparable fiscal, physical, and emotional harm on the class. As SSI recipients, class members are the poorest subset of older people and those with disabilities in the country. Yet, individual class members have accrued overpayments in the thousands of dollars while SSA failed for months after *Windsor* to recognize Plaintiffs' marriages, and any recoupment will reduce benefits recipients need for basic living expenses. See, e.g., Richardson-Wright Decl., Ex. E (demanding payment of \$4,129.88); Held Decl., Ex. A (demanding payment of \$6,205). Such sudden multi-thousand-dollar liabilities would cause financial distress in families even of modest means, especially when it is uncertain when the hammer might fall. To Plaintiffs, they are undeniably crippling. For example, for the months of January to March 2015, SSA deducted from Plaintiff Kelley Richardson-Wright's monthly SSI payment in order to recover the overpayment caused by SSA's actions. Richardson-Wright Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 27. This reduction caused Ms. Richardson-Wright to forgo basic necessities and put her at risk of eviction from her home. Id at \P 22. The stress from the extreme financial strain caused her to be hospitalized. Id at \P 23. While she was in the hospital, her wife's car was repossessed. *Id* at \P 24. While SSA has now ceased its unlawful withholding from Ms. Richardson-Wright and granted both her and Mr. Held a waiver, an injunction is necessary to protect other class members from the same needless suffering. As the Ninth

Circuit explained in *Lopez v. Heckler*, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983):

[B]ecause the members of plaintiffs' class are largely infirm and disabled, their resources and life spans are by definition extremely limited. Deprivation of benefits pending trial might cause economic hardship, suffering or even death. Retroactive restoration of benefits would be inadequate to remedy these hardships.

see also Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We fail to comprehend the Secretary's argument that financial compensation at some future date, should the claimants survive and prevail, mitigates the hardship which is visited upon claimants and their families each and every day.").

C. The Harm to Plaintiffs Outweighs the Harm to SSA

In contrast to the serious financial harm, uncertainty, and emotional strain that SSA's actions have already caused and will cause Plaintiffs, the only possible harm to SSA from a preliminary injunction would be the cost of temporarily halting its recoupment efforts for all class members. This purely administrative concern pales in comparison to Plaintiffs' physical and emotional suffering.

Indeed, SSA's own failure to promptly implement *Windsor* is itself a tacit admission that SSA did not deem avoidance of overpayments a meaningful priority. SSA's recent emergency action to put new overpayment recoupment actions temporarily on hold also demonstrates that halting those efforts is not only

warranted but fiscally and administratively feasible, if not even prudent. As the Ninth Circuit has explained in similar circumstances:

[T]he physical and emotional suffering shown by plaintiffs ... is far more compelling than the possibility of some administrative inconvenience or monetary loss to the government.... Faced with such a conflict between financial concerns and preventable human suffering, we have little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs' favor.

Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1437; see also Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Balancing the medical or financial hardship to the plaintiffs-appellees against the financial hardship to the state resulting from its inability to recover for medical services should its rules ultimately be held valid, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district judge to find that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in favor of plaintiffs.").

D. The Public Interest Favors an Injunction

Congress created SSI because it recognized that it is in the public interest to ensure that the aged, blind, and disabled can afford basic necessities. It is also in the public interest to ensure that the government does not unconstitutionally discriminate against its citizens. Thus, public interest is served when those that unlawfully discriminate, not the discriminated-against class, bear the burden,

uncertainty, and harm caused by their discrimination. Granting a preliminary injunction in this case will protect and advance these public interests. The Ninth Circuit has already eloquently stated all that needs to be said:

Our society as a whole suffers when we neglect the poor, the hungry, the disabled, or when we deprive them of their rights or privileges.... It would be tragic, not only from the standpoint of the individuals involved but also from the standpoint of society, were poor, elderly, disabled people to be wrongfully deprived of essential benefits for any period of time.

Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1437-38; see also Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 2014) (dissolving stay of order striking down Idaho's prohibition of marriage by people of the same sex because of the "public's interest in equality of treatment of persons deprived of important constitutional rights").

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter a preliminary injunction (1) enjoining SSA from making any effort to recoup overpayments caused by SSA's failure to recognize Plaintiffs' marriages after the *Windsor* decision; and (2) requiring SSA to return any such funds already withheld or otherwise received.

1	Dated: June 17, 2015.	
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